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Abstract
In this paper, we test whether the West African Monetary Zone (WAMZ) is a common currency area by using a structural vector autoregressive
model to study the variance decomposition, impulse responses of key economic variables and linear dependence of the underlying structural
shocks of the countries in the zone. The variance decomposition shows that the zone as a whole does not have common sources of shock, which
is expected because of the diverse economic structures of these countries. The correlation of the structural shocks also shows that these countries
respond asymmetrically to common supply, demand and monetary shocks and will therefore respond differently to a common monetary policy.
It is therefore not in the interest of the individual countries to go into a monetary union now or in the near future unless the economies of these
countries converge further.
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1.  Introduction
The quest for monetary union within Economic Community
of West African States (ECOWAS) began with the establish-
ment of the regional body in May 1975. This quest reflects
in the objectives, as stated in article 2 section 2h of the 1975
Treaty of Lagos, a treaty that establishes the community, that
the community shall ensure “harmonization, required for the
proper functioning of the community, of the monetary policies
of the member states.” This is restated in article 3 section 2e
of the July 1991 treaty as “the establishment of an economic
union through the adoption of common policies in the eco-
nomic, financial, social and cultural sectors, and the creation
of a monetary union.” The 15 member states that ratified the
Treaty of Lagos are Benin, Burkina Faso, Côte d’Ivoire, The
Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Liberia, Mali, Mauri-
tania, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone, and Togo. Cape
Verde joined the community in 1976 and Mauritania left in
2000, leaving the current membership still at 15 states. The
∗ Corresponding author. Tel.: +233 507427839.
E-mail addresses: sharvey@ug.edu.gh (S.K. Harvey), mcushing1@unl.edu
(M.J. Cushing).
Peer review under responsibility of Africagrowth Institute.
community is made up of English, French and Portuguese speak-
ing countries.
At the time of establishment of ECOWAS, there was one
monetary zone in West Africa West Africa Economic and Mone-
tary Union (WAEMU) which is composed of Francophone West
African countries. The CFA, which is the single currency in the
West Africa Economic and Monetary Union (WAEMU), circu-
lates among the member countries. Anglophone West African
countries, however, have their independent currencies. The idea
of introducing a single currency for ECOWAS as a whole was
re-enforced in the July 1991 Treaty ratified by all member states.
It has been proposed to implement the monetary integration
process in two stages by forming a second monetary zone, the
West African Monetary Zone (WAMZ) for the Anglophone West
Africa, which will later merge with the existing zone, the West
Africa Economic and Monetary Union (WAEMU). Since the
introduction of the proposed single currency is in two stages,
i.e. forming a monetary union among the non-CFA countries
and later merge with the CFA countries, we think that analyzing
the convergence of non-CFA countries alone will draw a better
picture of what is needed now by ECOWAS.
In this paper, we test whether the West African Monetary
Zone (WAMZ) is a optimum currency area by using a vec-
tor autoregressive model to study the variance decomposition,
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.rdf.2015.05.001
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impulse responses of key economic variables and by analyzing
linear dependence of and feedback between the structural shocks
recovered from a structural vector autoregressive (SVAR) model
of key economic variables in the region. Countries with symmet-
ric shocks are expected to have linearly dependent shocks and
exhibit some level of feedback between these shocks. Also, if
the sources of shock to the region are common, then the struc-
ture of the variance decomposition should be similar across the
zone.
Apart from contributing to the academic literature on mone-
tary integration in West Africa, the approach used in this paper
adds value to the previous studies in West Africa by measuring
the level of integration achieved by the participating countries in
terms of their response to common shocks. The methodologies
used in the previous studies do not allow for the direct measure-
ment of supply, demand and monetary shocks to the economies
of the individual countries and their response to common shocks.
This will also inform policy on the adoption of the single cur-
rency, the eco, in the zone and also to have an idea of how the
economies of the zone converge ex-ante or will converge ex-post
after the introduction of the eco.
The question of what constitutes an optimum currency area is
pioneered by Mundell (1961) who defines an optimum currency
area as a domain within which exchange rates are fixed. Within
this domain, a single currency can be introduced under a single
central bank with the power to issue and redeem currency and
conduct monetary policy. The issue of an appropriate domain is
addressed by Mundell (1961) by suggesting that the domain is
a region that is defined such that there is internal factor mobility
and external factor immobility and “if factors are mobile across
national boundaries, then a flexible exchange system becomes
unnecessary and may even be positively harmful”.
The work of Mundell (1961) inspired a series of papers.
In particular, McKinnon (1963) describes the optimum cur-
rency area as an area within which there is a single currency
and within which the same monetary and fiscal policies and
flexible external exchange rates can be used to address the objec-
tives of employment, international payments and price stability
which are sometimes in conflict. McKinnon emphasizes the
need for price stability within the region and the openness of
the economies that should be considered optimum for a single
currency. McKinnon (1963) also added the importance of fac-
tor mobility across industries to Mundell’s argument for factor
mobility across countries in determining an optimum currency
area.
The issue of factor mobility is further examined by Kenen
(1969). He asserts that “when regions are defined by their activ-
ities, not geographically or politically, perfect interregional labor
mobility requires perfect occupational mobility and this can only
come about when labor is homogeneous” (Kenen, 1969). Kenen
(1969) also advances product diversification and fiscal integra-
tion of a region as major criteria for an optimum currency area.
Kenen (1969) argues that diversity in a region’s product mix may
be a more relevant criterion than labor mobility and that well
diversified is economy is more likely to have a well-diversified
export sector, which can mitigate external shocks by positive
and negative shocks canceling out without resulting to exchange
rate changes in response to the shock. Fiscal integration also
ensures that weaker economies within the region are supported
during recovery from external shocks. Eichengreen (1991) also
defines an optimum currency area as “an economic unit com-
posed of regions affected symmetrically by disturbances and
between which labor and other factors production flow freely.”
These characterizations of the optimal currency area in the
literature usually lead to categorization of all the criteria into
three. Firstly, the region should be subject to common sources
of shocks and symmetric response to shocks. This means that
shocks that are external to the region should induce the similar
responses across the region, that is, the response of the states in
the region to external shocks must be similar to ensure that the
same monetary and fiscal policies can address shock recovery
similarly across the region. Since the introduction of a single
currency in a region means that the countries that form the region
give up their autonomy over monetary policy, their individual
ability to respond to external shocks by using monetary policy is
also surrendered, therefore shock symmetry in the region ensures
that common monetary policy is feasible for the region. “The loss
of monetary flexibility has cost and benefit. One hand, a country
that gives up its currency loses a stabilization devise targeted
to domestic shocks, on the other hand, the country may gain
credibility and thereby reduce undesired inflation” (Alesina and
Barro, 2002). Alesina et al. (2002) also argue that the costs of
losing monetary autonomy are lower when shocks are symmetric
across that region.
Secondly, factor mobility within the region ensures that
shocks to the region dissipates quickly and similarly across.
Factors must be easily movable from surplus members states
to deficit member states in the region in times where shocks to
the region have asymmetric effects. This ensures full employ-
ment and price stability in the region. Lastly, fiscal integration is
needed in the region to redistribute resources among the member
state. This is a system where fiscal policies of the different states
in the region are coordinated by a common federal institution
like the IRS and congress of the United States. By this arrange-
ment, collection and disbursement of certain taxes are done by
federal institution and in time economic downturn, weak states
can easily be bailed out through these arrangements.
As summarized by Bayoumi (1994), “the choice of a currency
union depends upon the size of the underlying disturbances, the
correlation between these disturbances, the costs of transactions
across currencies, factor mobility across regions, and the interre-
lationships between demand for different goods.” So the obvious
question to ask is whether ECOWAS is an optimum currency
area, that is, does the region satisfy the criteria for the introduc-
tion of a common currency? This is the question this study sets
to investigate.
2.  Evolution  of  the  West  African  Monetary  Union  and
West African  Monetary  Zone
According to Soyibo (1998) before ECOWAS was estab-
lished in 1975, there were two monetary unions in West Africa.
Under British colonial rule, Anglophone West Africa made up
of Gambia, Ghana, British Cameroon, Nigeria and Sierra Leone
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used a common currency, the British West African pound man-
aged by the West African Currency Board. However, when
Ghana gained independence in 1957 and establish her central
bank, the Bank of Ghana, she began issuing her own national cur-
rency the cedi in 1958. Nigeria also issued her national currency,
the naira, in 1958 with establishment of the Central Bank of
Nigeria to replace the British West African pound. By 1968, the
British West African pound collapsed when the other members
issued their own currencies.
The francophone West Africa, made up of Benin, Burkina
Faso, Côte d’Ivoire, Mali, Niger, Senegal, and Togo, also had
and still has a common currency: the CFA franc inherited from
France, the colonial rulers of these countries. The CFA franc
survived the post independence collapse of monetary harmo-
nization, unlike the case for Anglophone West Africa, and
established the West African Economic and Monetary Union
(WAEMU) in 1994 with a single central bank BanqueCentrale
des Etats de l’Afrique de l’Ouest (BCEAO) and a common cur-
rency (CFA) which was fully convertible within the French franc
zone. The WAEMU countries have common monetary and fis-
cal policies. Lending to government, for example, is fixed at 20
percent of the estimated revenue of the previous year (Soyibo,
1998).
The West African Clearing House (WACH), a multilateral
payment system, was set up in 1975, immediately after the
founding of ECOWAS to provide settlement services among
the central banks and to facilitate the monetary integration pro-
cess in the whole of West Africa. This has been transformed
into West African Monetary Agency (WAMA) in 1996. A more
comprehensive program called the ECOWAS Monetary Coop-
eration Programme (EMCP) was launched in 1987 with its main
objective of creating a single monetary zone and introducing a
common currency. The initial idea had been to introduce a sin-
gle currency for all the member states of ECOWAS at a time,
but this idea was later changed to the formation of a second
monetary zone with a single currency, called the eco, when
in April 2000 Accra Declaration four Anglophone members of
ECOWAS Gambia, Ghana, Nigeria, Sierra Leone and one fran-
cophone member Guinea launched an initiative to establish the
second monetary zone in West Africa. December 2000 Bamako
Accord established the West African Monetary Zone (WAMZ),
the West African Monetary Institute (WAMI) and Stabilization
and Cooperation Fund (SCF) alongside eight-member franco-
phone West African Economic and Monetary Union (WAEMU).
WAMI was established by this accord to undertake all necessary
tasks leading to the setting up of the West African Central Bank
(WACB) and the introduction of a common currency (WAMI,
2002). The five countries had pledged to adopt a common cur-
rency by January 2003 and to work toward merging their planned
monetary union with the WAEMU by January 2004 (Asante and
Masson, 2001). These ambitious targets could not be met by
these countries because of the failure to meet the set conver-
gence criteria. Liberia later joined the WAMZ in February 2010
as the sixth member with Cape Verde an observer.
In November 2002 the Forum of Finance Ministers of WAMZ
decided to facilitate the harmonization of fiscal and monetary
policies by introducing two sets of convergence criteria, four
primary and six secondary, for members. According to WAMI
(2002), these criteria are as follows:
The primary criteria
(i) Achieve and maintain price stability by recording single
digit end of period inflation rate by 2003 and 5 percent by
2004.
(ii) Ensure sustainable government fiscal position by reducing
the ratio of budget deficit (excluding grants) on commit-
ment basis to GDP to 4 percent or less throughout the period
2003–2005.
(iii) Limit Central Bank financing of government budget deficit
as a percent of previous year’s tax revenue to 10 percent or
less throughout the period 2003–2005.
(iv) Maintain sufficient level of gross official foreign exchange
reserves of at least 3 months of import cover throughout the
period 2003–2005.
The secondary criteria
(i) Prohibition of new domestic arrears and liquidation of
existing ones.
(ii) Tax revenue to GDP ratio equal to or greater that 20 percent.
(iii) Wage bill to tax revenue ratio equal to or less than 35
percent.
(iv) Public investment to tax revenue equal to or greater than
20 percent.
(v) Maintain real exchange rate stability.
(vi) Positive real interest rate.
The primary criteria would ensure that the economies of the
member states converge in the sense of having symmetric shocks
while the secondary criteria would ensure fiscal convergence.
Throughout the period 2001–2009 only two countries, Gambia
and Nigeria, satisfy all four primary criteria in 2007 and 2008
and only Gambia satisfies all criteria in 2008 and 2009. These
developments brought a lot of doubts about the possibility of
a successful introduction of a common currency, the eco, in
the WAMZ. Debrun et al. (2005), for example, show that the
proposed monetary union is not incentive compatible for most
of the existing non-CFA members of ECOWAS unless there are
institutional changes. A new time for the introduction of the new
currency, by which it is hoped all the economies in the region
will meet the convergence criteria, is 2015. These unsuccessful
attempts at introducing the currency in the previous set dates
also bring into focus the sustainability of the eco when it is
introduced since there are still staggering efforts at introducing
it.
3.  Empirical  literature
The empirical testing of the optimum currency area criteria
has taken several forms including testing the synchronization
of business cycles of the members of the region and measuring
shock asymmetry of the countries in the region, indices, among
others. Among the many studies that use the business cycles
approach are Frankel and Rose (1996, 1997) and Kouparitas
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(2001), and the general understanding is that the cost of los-
ing autonomy over monetary policy will be lower if business
cycles of the countries in the region synchronizes. Measure-
ment of shock asymmetry using VAR has been done mainly
for Europe, and the major studies in this area include Bayoumi
and Eichengreen (1992), Kempa (2002) and Buigut and Valev
(2005).
Bayoumi and Eichengreen (1997) construct an Optimum
Currency Area (OCA) index for the European countries and
use that to divide the countries in euro zone into three groups:
high level of readiness, tendency to converge and little or no evi-
dence to converge. Bayoumi and Ostry (2010) use correlation of
output growth and inflation across countries in the regions and
also regress real output per capita on its first and second lags
and interpret the residuals to mean the underlying real output
disturbances and conclude that there is little evidence that sub-
Saharan African countries would benefit from currency union in
the near future.
Unlike the European Union, studies on the ECOWAS mon-
etary integration are scanty. Since the seminal work by Soyibo
(1998), little empirical work has been done on the ECOWAS
monetary integration process. Debrun et al. (2003) examine
the rationale for establishing regional currency unions in west-
ern Africa and conclude that monetary unification might well
be beneficial for a number of the member states of the Eco-
nomic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) despite
dramatic economic, political and historical differences between
the two regions in the community. This is because the costs of
these countries losing their monetary autonomy are often more
than offset by the gains originating in the (partial) separation
of monetary and fiscal powers. They argue however, that large
countries with relatively ambitious public expenditure objec-
tives, like Nigeria, would not be attractive partners because they
would be expected to pressure the common central bank, cre-
ating excessive inflation in the entire union. Based on those
arguments, they conclude that the desirability and sustainability
of a currency union within ECOWAS critically depend on fiscal
discipline among its members and on a strong fiscal surveillance
procedure both in the transition phase and after the establishment
of the union. Masson and Patillo (2003) conclude that “mone-
tary union in West Africa can be effective agency of restraint on
fiscal policies only if the hands of the fiscal policy authorities
are also tied by a strong set of fiscal restraint criteria, applicable
not just for accession to monetary union, but throughout the life
of the union”.
Ogunkola (2005) uses real exchange rate model to analyze
the viability of a single monetary zone in ECOWAS and con-
cludes that ECOWAS is closer to a monetary union than before.
Debrun et al. (2005) also conclude, based on the calibration of
their model, that lack of fiscal convergence, not the low level of
regional trade or asymmetry of shocks, is the primary obstacle
to the creation of a well-functioning and acceptable monetary
union in West Africa. These two studies consider both the CFA
and non-CFA zones and conclude based on the two zones form-
ing a single monetary union.
On the failure of the introduction of the single currency for
three consecutive times, Ojo (2005) notes that the failures are
attributable to inadequate political commitment, political insta-
bility and inability to sufficiently carry along all the stakeholders
in the process of program implementation. There is the need for
the common market program to be implemented to complement
the monetary integration program (Obaseki, 2005). Sagbamah
(2005) highlights the important lessons of the European Union
that should be learned by ECOWAS and provide the needed
political will, social enlightenment campaign and mobilization,
homogeneous product and financial markets, basic infrastruc-
tural production and economic structures, before transiting into
a monetary union.
Debrun et al. (2005) are of the view that fiscal heterogeneity
indeed appears critical in shaping regional currency blocs that
would be mutually beneficial for all their members. In particular,
Nigeria’s membership in the configurations currently envisaged
would not be in the interests of other ECOWAS countries unless
it were accompanied by effective containment on Nigeria’s
financing needs. But Iyare et al. (2005) note that while fiscal con-
vergence among members is desirable, other mechanisms like
payment systems and labor mobility issues should be established
beyond fiscal convergence, if such a union is to be successful.
Balogun (2007) estimates a dynamic panel data model
using data available on West African Monetary Zone (WAMZ)
countries and examines the monetary and macroeconomic sta-
bility perspective for entering into monetary union. By testing
the hypothesis that independent monetary and exchange rate
policies have been relatively ineffective in influencing domestic
activities (especially GDP and inflation), and that when they do,
they are counterproductive, he concludes that the members of
the WAMZ would be better off surrendering their independence
over some policy instruments to the planned regional body under
appropriate monetary union arrangements.
Balogun (2009) examines the determinants of inflation differ-
entials in a panel of West African Monetary Zone (WAMZ) states
vis-à-vis its set benchmark for macroeconomic convergence
since 2000. Over the sample period, he finds that the un-
weighted average regional inflation rates were most often above
a single digit target and vary widely among the countries. The
major monetary policy instruments determinants of inflationary
divergence are the pursuit of distorted interest rates, exchange
rates overvaluation and expansionary monetary policies.
It is clear from the empirical evidence that the ex ante con-
ditionality for the introduction of the single currency in West
African Monetary Union will be difficult to achieve. But it is
possible, like the UEMOA countries, for the WAMZ to achieve
optimality ex post. Achieving ex post optimum currency area
can be ensured if there are common sources of shock and shock
symmetry across the region and that is what this study sets out
to measure.
4.  Methodology
4.1.  The  SVAR  model
The empirical analysis of shock asymmetry is based on the
stochastic rational expectations open economy macroeconomic
model developed by Clarida and Gali (1994) and also used by
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Kempa (2002) to analyze the convergence of the euro zone
countries an optimum currency area. “The model exhibits the
results of the standard Mundell-Fleming-Dornbusch model in
both the short run when prices adjust sluggishly to demand,
money and supply shocks and long run properties that charac-
terize macroeconomic equilibrium in the open economy once
prices adjust full to all shocks” (Clarida and Gali, 1994).
Let yt = (x1tx2tx3t)′ be a vector of endogenous variables
where x1t is a measure of growth of economic activity of a coun-
try relative to the US, x2t is the change in bilateral real exchange
rates between each country’s currency and the US dollar and x3t
is the change in price level of each country relative to the US
price level. The dynamic structural representation of the model
is
Γyt =  μ  +
p∑
j=1
Btyt−j +  vt (1)
where Γ  is a 3 ×  3 matrix of contemporaneous coefficients
among the endogenous variables, μ  is a vector of constants, Bj
is a 3 ×  3 matrix of structural coefficients, vt is a vector of ortho-
gonal structural shocks to the system so that
∑
v =  E
(
vtv
′
t
)
=
I. The reduced form of Eq. (1) is
yt =  Γ−1μ  +
∑
Γ−1Btyt−j +  Γ−1vt (2)
this can be written as
yt =  ν  +
p∑
j=1
Θjyt−j +  et (3)
where Γ−1μ,  Θj =  Γ−1j Bj , and etΓ−1vt . Eq. (3) can also be
written as
yt =  ν  +  Θ(L)yt +  et (4)
where Θ(L) = L  + L2 + · · · + Lp and L is a lag operator. Given that
the system in Eq. (4) is stable, we can re-write (4) as a moving
average representation, by Wold’s decomposition.
(I −  Θ(L)) yt =  ν  +  et (5)
yt(I  −  Θ(L))−1ν  + (I  −  Θ(L))−1et (6)
yt =  μ0 +
∞∑
j=0
Φjet−j (7)
Now suppose, as in Blachard and Quah (1989), Clarida and Gali
(1994) and Kempa (2002) that the estimated MA representation,
based on estimation of the reduced form equation in (4), is given
by
yt =  et +  C1et−1 +  C2et−2 +  · ·  · (8)
and the true MA representation of the actual data generating
process is
yt =  A0vt +  A1vt−1 +  A2vt−2 +  · ·  · (9)
from Eq. (3)
et =  Γ−1vt (10)
substituting Eq. (10) to Eq. (8) gives
yt =  Γ−1vt +  C1Γ−1vt−1 +  C2Γ−1vt−2 +  ·  · ·  (11)
comparing Eqs. (9) and (11) give us
A0 =  Γ−1,  et =  A0vt for j  =  0 Aj =  CjA0 for j  >  0
(12)
This shows the relationship between the vector of structural
shocks vt and the vector of reduced form residuals et, which
is equivalent to the C-model of Amisano and Giannini (1997).
By knowing A0, we can recover the structural shocks from the
innovations. From Eq. (12) we can write∑
e
E(ete′t) =  A0E(vtv
′
t)A
′
0 =  A0A
′
0 (13)
⎛
⎜⎝
w11 w21 w31
w12 w22 w32
w13 w23 w33
⎞
⎟⎠ =
⎛
⎜⎝
a110 a210 a310
a120 a220 a320
a130 a230 a330
⎞
⎟⎠
⎛
⎜⎝
a110 a120 a130
a210 a220 a230
a310 a320 a330
⎞
⎟⎠
w11 =  a2110 +  a2210 +  a2310
w22 =  a2120 +  a2220 +  a2320
w33 =  a2130 +  a2230 +  a2330
w21 =  w12 +  a120a110 +  a220a210 +  a320a310
w31 =  w13 +  a130a110 +  a230a210 +  a330a310
w32 =  w23 +  a130a120 +  a230a220 +  a330a320
This is a system of 6 equations with 9 unknowns since
∑
e is
a symmetric matrix estimated from the VAR in Eq. (3), this
implies that A0 is not identified. In order to be able to iden-
tify A0 and recover the structural shocks vt we need to impose
three additional restrictions on the elements of A0. In this paper
since the structural model derives from the structural model of
Clarida and Gali (1994), the alignment of the shocks also fol-
lows. The shock to economic growth is aligned as the supply
shock because supply shocks are known to be the main unex-
pected changes in output in developing countries especially.
Shocks to real exchange rates are identified as demand shocks
because these countries are import-dependent, so excess import
demand drives exchange rates. Shocks to price changes are also
labeled as monetary shocks because money is assumed to be neu-
tral. Clarida and Gali (1994) and Kempa (2002) use Blachard
and Quah (1989) decomposition to identify A0. This decompo-
sition states that “only supply shocks v1t influence changes in
real output levels in the long run, while both supply and demand
shocks v2t influence real exchange rates in the long run. Mone-
tary shocks v3t have no long run impact on either change in real
output levels or real exchange rates” (Clarida and Gali, 1994).
This statement imposes three restrictions on A0. A short run view
of these restrictions is
a210 =  a310 =  a320 =  0
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given the arrangement of the variables in the VAR. Blachard and
Quah (1989) restrictions are long run restriction; therefore the
restrictions imply that
∞∑
i=0
a21i =
∞∑
i=0
a31i =
∞∑
i=0
a32i =  0
These restrictions imply that the matrix
∞∑
j=0
Aj =
∞∑
j=0
CjA0
is a lower triangular matrix. Blachard and Quah (1989) show
that these restrictions identify A0 and we can recover vt as
vt =  A−10 et
In order to ensure the stability of the VAR and be able to
explore it’s properties I check the stationarity properties of the
series using Augmented Dickey–Fuller test. The optimum lag
order selection is based on Akaike Information Criterion.
4.2.  Linear  dependence  of  and  feedback  between  the
structural shocks
The linear dependence of two time series xt and yt can be
decomposed into a sum of contemporaneous linear feedback
between xt and yt, linear feedback from xt to yt and linear feed-
back from xt to yt. Geweke (1982) shows that if the series are
stationary, nondeterministic, autoregressive and have moving
average representation, then linear dependence of xt and yt (FX,Y)
can be decomposed as
FX,Y = ˆFX→Y + ˆFY→X + ˆFXY (14)
where FX→Y, FX→Y, and FX→Y are calculated from the variances
and covariance of the residuals in the following autoregressive
models:
xt =
p∑
s=1
E1sxt−s +  u1t ˆΣ1 = ˆU ′1 ˆU1 (15)
xt =
p∑
s=1
E2sxt−s +
p∑
s=1
E2syt−s +  u1t ˆΣ2 = ˆU ′2 ˆU2 (16)
yt =
p∑
s=1
G1syt−s +  v1t ˆT1 = ˆV ′1 ˆV1 (17)
yt =
p∑
s=1
G2syt−s +
p∑
s=1
H2sxt−s +  v2t ˆT2 = ˆV ′2 ˆV2 (18)
ˆC = ˆU ′2 ˆV2 ˆΥ =
(
ˆΣ2 ˆC
ˆC
′
ˆT2
)
(19)
and
FX→Y =  ln
( |T1|
|T2|
)
, FY→X =  ln
( |Σ1|
|T2|
)
,
FX.Y =  ln
( |T2|.|Σ2|
|Υ  |
)
,  FX,Y =  ln
( |Σ2|.|T1|
|Υ  |
)
(20)
X  and Y  are linearly independent if and only if Σ1 = Σ2.
Under the null hypothesis of no linear feedback where
n ˆFX,Y ,  n ˆFX→Yn ˆFY→X, and n ˆFX.Y have chi-squared distri-
bution with degrees of freedom kl(2p  + 1), klp, klp, and kl,
respectively, where k is the number of variables in xt, l is the
number of variables in yt, p is the number of autoregressive lags
and n  is the number of observations.
Geweke (1982) is used to measure and decompose linear
dependence between pairs of countries and compared with lin-
ear dependence of Germany, France, Spain, Italy and Greece to
determine if the West African countries are ready for a mone-
tary union. We expect the structural shocks of economies that
converge to be linearly dependent.
4.3.  Data
The data for the estimation of the models are extracted from
International Financial Statistics (IFS) and Direction of Trade
Statistics (DOTS) by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and
directly from some central banks and statistical organizations of
some of the countries. The data on consumer price index and
inflation for all the countries are extracted from October 2011
edition of IFS, except for Guinea and where these data are col-
lected from the website of BanqueCentrale de la République de
Guinée (BCRG) (bcrg-guinee.org). Data on nominal exchange
rates of each of the countries are taken from the IFS except for
Guinea where they are taken from the IFS for 1980 to 2005 and
the rest of the years from the website of Institut National de la
Statistique (stat-guinee.org) while the trade data are taken from
DOTS. I use monthly data from February 1987 to April 2011
for all the series. The period of the data for the paper is chosen
to insure that the data are available for all the variables for all
the countries in the study.
In measuring the variables that go into the models, many
studies use real GDP growth as a measure of real growth of the
economic activity but in the context of developing countries
such as the ECOWAS countries Bayoumi and Ostry (2010)
notes that “in Africa many of the shocks which affect economies
are temporary supply disturbances such as climatic shocks to
agriculture or terms of trade disturbances”. This is due to the sub-
sistence nature of agriculture, which is the dominant sector in the
economies of many of these countries. In this study I use growth
in total trade of each these countries, that is, exports plus imports
relative to US trade to measure growth of economic activity.
The use of the trade data also makes it possible to use monthly
data which increases frequency and range of the data. Therefore
the real growth for country i in the region is measured as
x1i =  dln
( (exports +  imports)i
(exports +  imports)US
)
.
The exchange rate variables are bilateral real exchange rates
of the countries’ currencies to the US dollar. The real exchange
rate for country i is measured as
x2i =  d(ei −  pi + pus)
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Table 1
Variance decomposition of the variables in the model.
Period Gambia Ghana Guinea Nigeria Sierra Leone
Monetary Demand Supply Monetary Demand Supply Monetary Demand Supply Monetary Demand Supply Monetary Demand Supply
Variance decomposition of real growth
1 0.01 0.34 99.65 0.09 1.94 97.97 0.41 0.28 99.31 0.1 0.19 99.71 0.04 9.23 90.73
3 0.31 0.49 99.2 0.14 2.4 97.47 1.49 0.75 97.76 0.24 0.73 99.04 0.12 12.03 87.84
6 0.31 0.49 99.2 0.48 2.59 96.93 1.5 0.86 97.64 0.24 0.73 99.04 0.3 12.59 87.11
12 0.31 0.49 99.2 0.49 2.61 96.9 1.5 0.86 97.64 0.24 0.73 99.04 0.31 12.59 87.1
24 0.31 0.49 99.2 0.49 2.61 96.9 1.5 0.86 97.64 0.24 0.73 99.04 0.31 12.59 87.1
36 0.31 0.49 99.2 0.49 2.61 96.9 1.5 0.86 97.64 0.24 0.73 99.04 0.31 12.59 87.1
Variance decomposition of real exchange rate changes
1 0.425 99.211 0.364 1.908 96.042 2.05 0.485 97.951 1.564 0.375 99.605 0.02 7.85 85.392 6.758
3 1.689 96.976 1.335 1.35 94 4.651 0.916 97.234 1.85 0.549 98.47 0.98 11.685 81.941 6.374
6 1.716 96.95 1.334 1.439 92.696 5.865 0.931 96.349 2.72 0.553 98.402 1.044 12.505 81.093 6.402
12 1.716 96.95 1.334 1.61 92.454 5.936 0.931 96.348 2.721 0.553 98.402 1.044 12.535 81.061 6.404
24 1.716 96.95 1.334 1.61 92.452 5.938 0.931 96.348 2.721 0.553 98.402 1.044 12.536 81.06 6.404
36 1.716 96.95 1.334 1.61 92.452 5.938 0.931 96.348 2.721 0.553 98.402 1.044 12.536 81.06 6.404
Variance decomposition of price changes
1 91.971 7.785 0.244 90.307 9.187 0.506 33.573 64.728 1.699 95.6 4.226 0.174 84.02 10.064 5.917
3 89.896 8.921 1.183 92.524 7.036 0.44 33.806 64.265 1.929 94.517 4.698 0.785 83.165 9.923 6.912
6 89.696 9.12 1.185 91.519 7.652 0.829 33.512 63.687 2.801 94.503 4.711 0.786 82.253 10.806 6.941
12 89.696 9.12 1.185 91.196 7.931 0.873 33.511 63.686 2.803 94.503 4.711 0.786 82.194 10.833 6.973
24 89.696 9.12 1.185 91.195 7.931 0.874 33.511 63.686 2.803 94.503 4.711 0.786 82.194 10.833 6.972
36 89.696 9.12 1.185 91.195 7.931 0.874 33.511 63.686 2.803 94.503 4.711 0.786 82.194 10.833 6.972
where ei is the log of bilateral nominal exchange rate for country
i, pi is the log of CPI of country i  and pUS is the log of CPI of
the USA.
The price variable is measured according to Kempa (2002)
where
x3i =  d  ln
(
pi
pUS
)
.
These variables are measured relative to the USA because the
US dollar is seen as an anchored currency of these countries as
shown in Alesina et al. (2002).
5.  Empirical  results
The measurement of the variables that go into the models
makes them naturally to be stationary at their levels. However,
ADF tests are used to formally check the stationarity properties
and found that they do not have unit roots. Akaike Information
Criterion is used to select the optimum lag for the models and
2, 5, 3, 2, and 3 lags are found to be optimum for the models of
Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Nigeria and Sierra Leone, respectively.
5.1.  Variance  decomposition
Variance decomposition is important in identifying the
sources of variability in the variables in the models for each
country in the region. This helps in determining whether the
sources of shock to variables in the models are common across
the region. Table 1 shows the variance decomposition of real
growth of economic activity, real exchange rates and price level
changes. The variance decomposition is presented for 1, 3, 6, 12,
24 and 36 lags to enable us compare the structure of the variance
decomposition after the system stabilizes across. Panels a, b and
c of Table 1 show the variance decomposition of real growth, real
exchange rate change and price level changes, respectively for
all the countries. Panel a shows that the supply shocks dominate
variability in output growth throughout, explaining at least 99
percent for Gambia, Ghana and Nigeria. While the structure of
the variance decomposition looks similar for these countries in
the region, the magnitude looks different for Sierra Leone with a
higher percentage of the variability in real growth explained by
demand shocks. Panel b of shows that for all the countries in the
region, demand shocks are dominant and persistent over time in
explaining exchange rate variability. Demand shocks explain at
least 97 percent of real exchange rate across the region for the
1-month ahead forecast variance and this stabilizes after third
period except for Sierra Leone. In panel c, the pattern of the vari-
ance decomposition for price level changes is different across the
region. At 36 lags, after the system stabilizes, about 90 percent
of the variance for Gambia is explained by monetary shocks, 91
percent for Ghana, 34 percent for Guinea 95 percent for Nigeria
and 82 percent for Sierra Leone. Clearly, the forecast variance
of prices is explained by different shocks across the zone except
for Ghana and Nigeria which are close for all the variables. This
suggests that the sources of external shock to real output growth
and real exchange rates in the region are common to the four
countries but the sources of shock to price level changes are not
common to any.
5.2.  Impulse  response  functions
Impulse response functions of all the variables for all the
countries in the region, which are not shown in the paper, show
for each country the response of real growth to a 1-standard
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deviation of supply, demand and monetary shocks. Also, the
response of real exchange rate changes and price level changes,
respectively to the same shocks is drawn. The graphs display the
dynamics of how the variables respond to the shocks. On impact,
the economies of all the countries in the region shrink at different
rates. The time it takes for the shock to dissipate varies among
the countries. While it takes Gambia about 6 periods for the
shock to dissipate, it takes Ghana about 5 periods, while Sierra
Leone’s shock lingers through to the 10th period. The response
to supply and monetary shock is not similar either. The response
of real exchange rates changes and price level changes to all
shocks across the region differs greatly in structure and inten-
sity. The differences in the rate at which the shocks dissipate
through impulse response functions of the countries show that
these countries have asymmetric shocks which is further inves-
tigated in the next section using a correlation of the structural
shocks.
5.3.  Linear  dependence  of  and  feedback  between  the
structural shocks
A measure of the level of convergence between the
countries, in the sense of an optimum currency area, is shock
symmetry between underlying structural shocks of the countries
in the region. The size and correlation of the underlying dis-
turbances are important for the choice of a currency union
(Bayoumi, 1994). If two economies converge, we expect under-
lying disturbances to be linearly dependent, in the sense of
Geweke (1982), because their response to the external shocks
will be similar. Shocks are symmetric if and only if they are lin-
early dependent in this sense. The existence of feedback between
the shocks of these countries in a region suggests that they have
a mechanism to correct any imbalances that will arise as a result
of external shocks that are specific to any of them. Also, linear
dependence of shocks ensures that common policies transmit to
these countries similarly. In this section we discuss the empiri-
cal results of measuring linear dependence and feedback of the
structural shocks of the countries in the West African Monetary
Zone (WAMZ) using Geweke (1982).
In order to put the results of the WAMZ countries in proper
perspective, these same measures are computed for five Euro-
pean countries in the euro zone: France, Germany, Greece, Italy
and Spain. These countries are chosen to include all the different
characters within the euro zone presently. France and Germany
remain strong after the introduction of the euro while Italy and
Spain are troubled and Greece is at the brink. The idea is to
Table 2
Relationship between supply shocks.
Gambia Ghana Guinea Nigeria Sierra Leone France Germany Greece Italy Spain
Linear dependence
Gambia
Ghana 0.025
Guinea 0.049 0.044
Nigeria 0.018 0.057 0.007
Sierra Leone 0.029 0.002 0.024 0.018
France 0.065 0.087 0.046 0.051 0.051
Germany 0.040 0.026 0.013 0.035 0.060 0.358
Greece 0.041 0.030 0.033 0.075 0.051 0.218 0.291
Italy 0.071 0.077 0.058 0.047 0.045 0.500 0.276 0.284
Spain 0.057 0.038 0.045 0.077 0.039 0.254 0.138 0.220 0.213
Contemporaneous linear feedback
Gambia
Ghana 0.004
Guinea 0.008 0.014
Nigeria 0.004 0.044 0.002
Sierra Leone 0.010 0.000 0.000 0.000
France 0.010 0.008 0.006 0.004 0.010
Germany 0.036 0.015 0.004 0.010 0.026 0.263
Greece 0.010 0.003 0.011 0.052 0.009 0.064 0.255
Italy 0.019 0.005 0.014 0.009 0.002 0.474 0.182 0.115
Spain 0.001 0.005 0.002 0.007 0.001 0.200 0.054 0.073 0.163
Linear feedback
Gambia 0 0.00 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.05 0.00 0.03 0.04 0.05
Ghana 0.02 0 0.02 0.01 0.00 0.03 0.00 0.03 0.04 0.03
Guinea 0.02 0.01 0 0.00 0.01 0.03 0.00 0.01 0.04 0.04
Nigeria 0.00 0.00 0.00 0 0.01 0.03 0.02 0.01 0.03 0.05
Sierra Leone 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.01 0 0.04 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.04
France 0.00 0.05 0.01 0.01 0.00 0 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.05
Germany 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.08 0 0.02 0.08 0.08
Greece 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.15 0.01 0 0.14 0.14
Italy 0.01 0.03 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.03 0 0.04
Spain 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.01 0
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Table 3
Relationship between demand shocks.
Gambia Ghana Guinea Nigeria Sierra Leone France Germany Greece Italy Spain
Linear dependence
Gambia
Ghana 0.006
Guinea 0.068 0.512
Nigeria 0.042 0.035 0.015
Sierra Leone 0.024 0.441 0.081 0.079
France 0.054 0.558 0.009 0.019 0.245
Germany 0.037 0.021 0.041 0.013 0.025 0.470
Greece 0.026 0.541 0.012 0.014 0.178 0.101 0.107
Italy 0.094 0.536 0.007 0.011 0.234 0.070 0.155 0.102
Spain 0.074 0.540 0.019 0.008 0.249 0.155 0.139 0.090 0.163
Contemporaneous linear feedback
Gambia
Ghana 0.000
Guinea 0.000 0.000
Nigeria 0.014 0.000 0.002
Sierra Leone 0.011 0.006 0.000 0.070
France 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.001 0.006
Germany 0.000 0.002 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.399
Greece 0.006 0.002 0.000 0.001 0.004 0.021 0.059
Italy 0.014 0.000 0.002 0.001 0.000 0.041 0.061 0.028
Spain 0.010 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.120 0.072 0.008 0.154
Linear feedback
Gambia 0 0.000 0.007 0.021 0.007 0.049 0.008 0.020 0.051 0.050
Ghana 0.005 0 0.511 0.019 0.399 0.538 0.003 0.527 0.533 0.539
Guinea 0.061 0.001 0 0.001 0.001 0.002 0.021 0.008 0.002 0.014
Nigeria 0.007 0.016 0.012 0 0.005 0.006 0.001 0.004 0.008 0.005
Sierra Leone 0.005 0.036 0.080 0.004 0 0.236 0.021 0.171 0.232 0.243
France 0.006 0.019 0.007 0.011 0.002 0 0.010 0.000 0.016 0.026
Germany 0.028 0.016 0.020 0.012 0.003 0.061 0 0.026 0.048 0.051
Greece 0.001 0.013 0.004 0.008 0.003 0.080 0.023 0 0.054 0.053
Italy 0.029 0.003 0.003 0.002 0.002 0.012 0.047 0.020 0 0.004
Spain 0.014 0.002 0.005 0.003 0.005 0.009 0.017 0.029 0.005 0
look at the coefficients of linear dependence and feedback that
are calculated for these European countries against their current
economic performance and use that information to discuss the
results of the WAMZ countries. We mostly use the coefficients
of France and Germany to indicate most convergent economies
and the coefficient for Greece or Italy with France or Germany as
the least convergent economies. We discuss linear dependence
and feedback for supply, demand and monetary shocks across
the WAMZ.
Tables 2–4 contain coefficients that measure linear depend-
ence, contemporaneous feedback and feedback between
countries in both directions. The tables contain the coefficients
for supply, demand and monetary shocks, respectively. The
coefficients at the upper part of the table are measures of linear
dependence; those at the middle part are measures of contempo-
raneous linear feedback. The lower diagonal of the lower part of
the table contains coefficients that measure feedback from sup-
ply shocks of countries in the row to supply shocks of countries
in the column. The upper diagonal does the reverse feedback.
5.3.1. Supply  shocks
In Table 2, France and Italy have the strongest linear depend-
ence of 0.500 while France and Germany have 0.358. Spain has
a coefficient of 0.139 with Germany and 0.213 with Italy, this
sets an upper limit of 0.500 and a lower limit of 0.139 for judg-
ing the convergence of the WAMZ countries relative to the euro
zone. As shown in Table 2, none of the WAMZ countries has a
coefficient with any other that fall within this interval. All these
countries fall far outside the range, even Ghana and Nigeria’s
coefficient of 0.057, which is the largest in the zone falls far
short of the interval.
Using similar arguments for establishing intervals for linear
dependence, the intervals for contemporaneous linear feedback
of the supply shocks is 0.474–0.054. Clearly, from the mid-
dle segment of Table 2, all the WAMZ countries have feedback
coefficients that are below the lower limit. These weak contem-
poraneous feedbacks imply that policies implemented in each
country will have no effect in other and common policies will
have different effects. For example, high rate of unemployment
in Ghana will not be reduced by increased industrial activity in
Nigeria and an expansionary monetary policy across the zone
might be inflationary in Ghana and contained by the increased
economic activity in Nigeria.
5.3.2.  Demand  shocks
In Table 3, France and Germany have the strongest linear
dependence of 0.470 while France and Italy have the lowest of
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Table 4
Relationship between monetary shocks.
Gambia Ghana Guinea Nigeria Sierra Leone France Germany Greece Italy Spain
Linear dependence
Gambia
Ghana 0.007
Guinea 0.034 0.106
Nigeria 0.031 0.083 0.018
Sierra Leone 0.012 0.080 0.027 0.035
France 0.130 0.172 0.035 0.040 0.061
Germany 0.076 0.079 0.025 0.037 0.016 0.219
Greece 0.017 0.143 0.005 0.012 0.073 0.052 0.089
Italy 0.136 0.120 0.018 0.036 0.048 0.312 0.262 0.073
Spain 0.055 0.115 0.034 0.010 0.049 0.214 0.072 0.073 0.226
Contemporaneous linear feedback
Gambia
Ghana 0.002
Guinea 0.002 0.001
Nigeria 0.018 0.001 0.010
Sierra Leone 0.001 0.001 0.002 0.023
France 0.062 0.059 0.007 0.022 0.002
Germany 0.029 0.028 0.006 0.022 0.003 0.160
Greece 0.006 0.002 0.000 0.001 0.016 0.000 0.043
Italy 0.070 0.010 0.000 0.024 0.000 0.280 0.193 0.009
Spain 0.010 0.002 0.003 0.001 0.000 0.209 0.035 0.006 0.206
Linear feedback
Gambia 0 0.005 0.003 0.012 0.005 0.044 0.000 0.011 0.046 0.041
Ghana 0.000 0 0.102 0.033 0.079 0.110 0.027 0.128 0.107 0.114
Guinea 0.030 0.003 0 0.002 0.002 0.024 0.006 0.002 0.010 0.025
Nigeria 0.001 0.049 0.006 0 0.002 0.015 0.002 0.003 0.007 0.008
Sierra Leone 0.006 0.000 0.023 0.010 0 0.044 0.011 0.045 0.045 0.045
France 0.024 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.014 0 0.006 0.002 0.028 0.000
Germany 0.046 0.023 0.013 0.013 0.002 0.053 0 0.012 0.058 0.033
Greece 0.001 0.013 0.003 0.008 0.012 0.050 0.033 0 0.058 0.045
Italy 0.021 0.003 0.008 0.005 0.002 0.004 0.011 0.006 0 0.009
Spain 0.003 0.000 0.006 0.001 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.023 0.011 0
0.070 that give the upper and lower limits, respectively. Ghana-
Guinea and Ghana-Sierra Leone have strong linear dependence
of 0.512 and 0.441, respectively. These are stronger than all
the European countries including France-Germany. In terms of
demand shocks, Ghana and Guinea seem to have high shock
symmetry.
Contemporaneous linear feedback is weak among the WAMZ
countries and is virtually zero for all the WAMZ countries. The
linear feedback is not much different between WAMZ and the
European countries.
5.3.3.  Monetary  shocks
An equivalent interval derived from Table 4 for Gewekey
linear dependence is 0.312–0.052. Only Ghana-Guinea coeffi-
cient of 0.101 falls within this interval. None of the WAMZ
countries fall within the interval for the contemporaneous lin-
ear dependence. The feedback between monetary shocks of the
WAMZ countries is as strong as that of the European countries,
including France and Germany.
6.  Conclusions
This paper investigates whether West African Monetary Zone
(WAMZ) is a common currency area by using a structural VAR
of real growth, real exchange rates and price level of five of
the six countries in the West African Monetary Zone (WAMZ).
WAMZ is a smaller group of countries within Economic Com-
munity of West African States (ECOWAS) that is in the process
of introducing a single currency the eco. The identification of
the structural shocks is based on Blachard and Quah (1989).
The evidence from the variance decomposition of the vari-
ables in the SVAR suggests that the region does not have
common sources of shock. Also, the impulses response func-
tions and the analysis of the structural shocks suggest that the
countries in the region do not respond symmetrically to all exter-
nal shocks. These suggest lack of ex-ante convergence in the
region to form an optimum currency area. However, Ghana and
Guinea seem to be close, both in commonness of sources of
shock and symmetry of shocks, and may be able to cope with a
single currency since the sources of shocks and shock recovery
rate between them is somehow similar. A piecemeal approach to
monetary union may be adopted where Ghana and Guinea adopt
a single currency and the other countries ascend to it over time.
This arrangement, however, may have serious implications for
the other countries that are not in the union on the onset because
as shown by Bayoumi (1994), while the gains from the monetary
union in the form of lower transaction costs are limited to the
members, the losses from the union in the form of lower output
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affect every country in the region. Unlike the Eurozone where
Bayoumi and Eichengreen (1997) find a core group of countries
within the union that is a common currency area, the findings
suggest that WAMZ does not have such a group.
These results confirm some previous studies on Economic
Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and contra-
dict others. The results of Bayoumi and Ostry (1997) on
Sub-Saharan Africa “indicate little evidence that Sub-Saharan
African countries would benefit in the near future from larger
currency unions” but Debrun et al. (2003) conclude that mone-
tary union in ECOWAS might be beneficial for a number of the
member states. Debrun et al. (2005) also conclude that because
of the fiscal heterogeneity of the countries in the union, Nigeria
especially might not be compatible with the rest of the countries.
Ogunkola (2005) also concludes that further convergence of the
economies in the region is required for a stable region-wide
monetary union in West Africa.
The results, however, contradict Balogun (2007) that argues
that the countries of the WAMZ are better off surrendering their
economies to a common monetary policy. This directly suggests
that these countries are better of with a common currency. Also,
Debrun et al. (2005) argue that asymmetric shocks are not the
problem but lack of fiscal convergence. Even though the current
study is on a sub set of ECOWAS, we can interpret the results
together with Debrun et al. (2005) to mean that both asymmetric
shocks and lack of fiscal convergence are the obstacles to the
introduction of the common currency.
Lessons from the current euro crisis, suggest that fiscal inte-
gration should precede the introduction of a single currency even
if the region satisfies all the other criteria, which is not the case
for WAMZ. There is also the need for further policy harmo-
nization and removal of barriers to factor mobility to enable
transmission of shocks through these economies to synchronize.
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